The concept of 'friends and neighbours voting' emerged out of V. O. Key's classic study of localism in southern US politics. He noted, in a section headed 'Friends and neighbors', that in Alabama especially (Key, 1949: 37) :
Candidates for state office tend to poll overwhelming majorities in their home counties and to draw heavy support in adjacent counties. Such voting behavior may be rationalized as a calculated promotion of local interest, yet it also points to the absence of stable, wellorganized, state-wide factions of like-minded citizens formed to advocate measures of common concern. In its extreme form localism justifies a diagnosis of low voter-interest in public issues and a susceptibility to control by the irrelevant appeal to support the hometown boy. In some instances, of course, localism may reflect concern about some general state issue bearing on the area. He extended that consideration of state office elections to intra-party primary contests there and concluded (p.41) that:
Almost any local leader with any prospects at all who aspires to state office can cut into the strength of established state leaders within his own immediate bailiwick. He gains support, not primarily for what he stands for or because of his capacities, but because of where he lives. A more or less totally irrelevant appeal -back the home-town boy -can exert no little influence over an electorate not habituated to the types of voting behavior characteristic of a two-party situation. After reviewing similar patterns across most of the southern states, he concluded (p.302) that 'Among the influences determining factional alignments in particular campaigns an important place must be assigned to localism'.
The concept of 'friends and neighbours' voting in certain types of election -especially those conducted within parties, such as primary contests -became part of the electoral geography lexicon (as in Taylor and Johnston, 1979, 274-290) . Most of the small number of studies of the phenomenon presented circumstantial evidence only -they displayed patterns (either cartographically or statistically) consistent with the 'hypothesis' of candidates performing better close to their homes than elsewhere across the area within which support was being sought, but without any clear evidence that such patterns resulted from voters practising localism. It was assumed that they did so either because they knew, or knew of, the local candidate and voted for her/him accordingly on a personal basis, or did so because by voting for the local candidate they would gain support for locally-relevant issues. In some cases -notably in Ireland where the use of STV preferential voting in multi-member constituencies encouraged parties to maximise their support by promoting different candidates in different parts of a constituency (e.g. Sacks, 1970; Parker, 1982 Parker, , 1986 Marsh, 2012, 2014: in their 2012 paper Górecki and Marsh argue for and demonstrate the potential collinearity between friends and neighbours voting and locally-focused campaigning) -'friends and neighbours' voting patterns are explicitly encouraged by the parties and their candidates, but these are rare.
Little attention has been paid to the mechanisms through which 'friends and neighbours' voting patterns might be promoted, therefore. One exception is a paper by Bowler et al. (1993) in which they argue that spatial variations in support for a candidate can result from the uneven distribution of relevant information through the relevant territory (see also Meredith, 2014) . If knowledge of and information about candidates is unevenly distributed across the electorate whose support is being canvassed, then uneven distributions of support for those candidates are likely to ensue. They evaluated this argument using data for Californian elections where information about candidates was unevenly distributed through local media markets that covered parts of the state only. In a state as large as California, the mechanisms traditionally associated with 'friends and neighbours voting' cannot account for the observed voting patterns, with clear distance-decay relationships between support for a candidate and distance from her/his home: as they put it, 'it is difficult to conceive of a candidate's personal friends and neighbors contacts producing the patterns observed here' (Bowler et al., 1993, 486) . Knowledge about candidates is also distributed through local media, and patterns of support were linked to the geography of their markets. The evidence was again circumstantialthere was no data on how voters became aware of a candidate's qualities or what determined whether they supported them -but it was entirely consistent with a model that did not rely entirely on local, inter-personal knowledge. If candidate information was locally-constrained, so might be candidate support.
We adopt and adapt this extension of the traditional 'friends and neighbours' model in our analysis here of two British intra-party elections -both for the leadership of the country's Labour party. These are high-profile events in which the party selects not only the leader of one of the country's two largest and longest-established political parties -in both of the cases analysed here, the party was in opposition at the time of the contest -but also potentially the country's future Prime Minister. Thus much of the focus is on the candidates' qualities, experience, expertise and leadership potential. Local issues, affecting part of Great Britain only, are relatively unimportantunless one or more candidates brings them into focus by stressing the interests of one part of the country and canvasses support there accordingly, which may boost the candidate's support but in itself will be insufficient to produce victory overall. Nevertheless, as argued below, 'friends and neighbours' voting patterns may emerge for a variety of reasons, and their existence is tested for both descriptively and through regression analysis.
Although the main focus of this paper is on two case studies of a particular intra-party election, a major goal of those analyses is to develop further the theoretical framework within which friends and neighbours voting patterns are studied. According to this framework, voting for individual candidates is based on a number of decision-making influences: support for a (known) local candidate; support for and from the local area; and the spread of information through both media and social networks -the latter not only from the candidate's home constituency but also from other nodes where that candidate's political friends' and allies' support is based. The nature of those separate but inter-related influences is set out in a later section.
Electing Labour's leader, 1994 and 2010
Between 1981 and 2010, the leader of the UK Labour party was elected by an electoral college, although details of the system changed over that period. The college was made up of three component sections: one comprised the party's MPs and MEPs, 1 another contained Constituency Labour Party (CLP) members, and the last consisted of the party's affiliated organisations (trade unions for the most part). In 2014 this format was abolished in favour of a 'one person, one vote' arrangement in a single electorate and this was deployed in the next leadership election, following Labour's defeat at the 2015 general election: 2 the electoral college was however used for other internal elections within the party after 2010 -such as the Scottish Labour leadership elections in 2011 and 2014, but in neither case was a full breakdown of voting published.
The analyses of friends-and-neighbours voting reported here are based on data published in Labour's National Executive Committee's annual report for 1994 and on unpublished material distributed at the Labour party conference in 2010 (Labour party, 1994, 84-92; Labour party, 2010) . These two leadership elections are particularly apt for such investigation as the electoral system was reformed in 1993 so that all votes in section two of the electoral college (that for CLPs) were made on the basis of a version of 'one member, one vote' (OMOV) and were attributed directly, in each constituency, to the candidate for whom they were cast. Data are unavailable for a directly comparable analysis of earlier contests: before 1981 MPs alone elected the party leader while between 1981 and 1993, each CLP simply cast a single vote for a candidate without reflecting the balance of opinion within the constituency. An intervening election, when Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair in 2007, was uncontested. The party did not published a breakdown of results for individual members voting on a CLP by CLP basis for the deputy leadership in that year (nor did it do so for other internal party elections between 1993 and 2010 in which the electoral college was deployed).
In the 1994 and 2010 contests, preferential voting was deployed in each section of the electoral college. The data, used here to explore the geography of the results, are: for section one of the college, the candidate who received the local MP's first preference vote; and for section two, the percentage of the first preference votes given to each candidate in each CLP. Labour MPs represented 271 constituencies at the time of the leadership contest in 1994 and 257 in 2010. In 1994 there were 633 reporting CLPs, in 2010 there were 632; constituency boundaries were redrawn in 2005 in Scotland and 2007 in the reminder of the UK. (In 1994 there was neither individual membership nor constituency organisation in Northern Ireland; for the 2010 leadership contest, members in Northern Ireland -who had been able to join the party since 2003 -were reported as part of a single CLP covering the whole province; those Northern Ireland voters are excluded from the current analyses.)
The 1994 contest was generated by the sudden death of John Smith, who had been elected as leader after Neil Kinnock's resignation following the party's defeat at the 1992 general election (see Rentoul, 1995, 353-380; Alderman and Carter, 1995) . Three candidates -Margaret Beckett, Tony Blair and John Prescott -obtained the requisite number of nominations from MPs to gain access to the ballot. All were senior members of the Shadow Cabinet. Margaret Beckett, from a working class background and a metallurgist by training, had worked as a Labour Party researcher in the early 1970s. She was first elected to the House of Commons (as Margaret Jackson) in 1974, representing Lincoln, but she lost that seat in 1979; she returned as MP for Derby South in the East Midlands at the next general election in 1983 and was elected Deputy Leader in 1992, going on to be Acting Leader in the interim following Smith's death. Beckett did not have substantial local ties to either of those constituencies. Born in Scotland, educated there as well as in the North-East of England, before studying at Oxford University and training as a lawyer, Tony Blair entered the House as MP for Sedgefield, in North-East England, in 1983 (having lost a by-election in Beaconsfield the previous year). He joined the party's front-bench in 1984, and by the time of Smith's death was Shadow Home Secretary. Blair had some slight links to the North-East: alongside some of his early school education there, his father had lectured at Durham University. He did not have any political involvement in the locale, however, only becoming involved in Labour politics in the mid-1970s on graduating from Oxford. Moreover, he had no base in his Sedgefield constituency prior to his selection: he was the last Labour candidate to be chosen before the 1983 general election. John Prescott, the third leadership candidate in 1994, a former merchant seaman and trade union activist -and like Margaret Beckett from a working-class background -was first elected as MP for Kingstonupon-Hull East in 1970 . By 1994 was Shadow Secretary of State for Employment. Having stood unsuccessfully to be Labour's Deputy Leader in 1988 and 1992 , in 1994 , following Blair's election to the leadership, Prescott defeated Beckett for the post. His local links with Hull were slight: brought up for the most part in Yorkshire and Cheshire, he had graduated from the University of Hull in 1968 as a mature student.
Both Beckett and Blair had no contact with their constituency before they were chosen to fight and represent it in 1983, therefore, whereas Prescott had represented Hull East constituency since 1970; he was likely to be better known by 1994 not only in his own constituency but also in the wider region, therefore, although he did not specifically canvass local and regional support. The contest was a relatively subdued affair: Blair remembered it later as passing off 'without incident… no great breakthroughs at that point, and no particular mishaps' (Blair, 2010, 74) . Overt campaigning was delayed until after the European Parliamentary Elections on 9 June, essentially out of respect to Smith. It was clear, however, pretty much from the time of Smith's death and well before the commencement of formal electioneering, that Blair was likely to win the contest: in June 1994, the journalist John Humphreys commented that 'only hours after the death of John Smith he [Blair] was being hailed throughout the land as the obvious successor' (BBC, 1994) . Prescott subsequently recalled that 'It [The contest] was all very amicable, as we knew roughly what the outcome was going to be' (Prescott, 2008, 189) . Uncertain as to exactly how the new procedures would work, union leaders were relatively subdued in their interventions (Wickham-Jones, 2014) . None of the candidates made much of a local dimension to their candidacies, though Blair launched his campaign at the Trimdon Labour club in his Sedgefield constituency. He packaged himself as the candidate most likely to reverse four successive general election defeats, although his modernising credentials were perhaps less clear than they subsequently became once he was established as Labour leader. Both Beckett and Prescott offered a more traditionally orientated approach.
On 21 July 1994 Tony Blair was duly elected Labour leader. The main impact of the new OMOV arrangements (in which each vote was directly allocated to the candidate for whom it was made) was that it was not the kind of crushing victory John Smith had enjoyed two years earlier (Smith took 91 per cent of the vote). Blair received just over 57 per cent of the final vote; Prescott was runner up with 24 per cent, and Beckett came third with just under 19 per cent (Labour Party, 1994, 8) . In a reversal of the 1992 deputy leadership result, Prescott defeated Beckett for that post. Blair performed consistently across all three sections of the electoral college, winning first preference votes from just under 61 per cent of MPs, 58 per cent of individual (CLP) members, and 52 per cent of affiliated members. 169 MPs had voted for Blair, 50 for Prescott and 48 for Beckett (two, including the Speaker of the House of Commons, did not vote). 3 The 2010 Labour leadership contest followed Gordon Brown's resignation both as Prime Minister and as party leader following defeat at the 2010 general election (Jobson and Wickham-Jones, 2010; and Pemberton and Wickham-Jones, 2013) . Five candidates obtained sufficient nominations to gain a place on the ballot paper. All had been prominent members of the Parliamentary party for some years -four had held Cabinet posts under Gordon Brown and the fifth, Diane Abbott, had served on major House of Commons committees and had a high public profile as the first black woman elected as an MP. All had been educated at either Oxford or Cambridge and four (again, Abbott was the exception) had worked as special advisors to government ministers before becoming MPs. Diane Abbott, David Miliband and Ed Miliband were Londoners; Ed Balls had a home background in Norwich and was educated in Nottingham; Andy Burnham was from Lancashire and was the only candidate to emphasise strongly his local roots and to campaign, in part at least, on local and regional issues. Of all the candidates in the two leadership elections under consideration here, therefore, Burnham represents, in terms of his identity and of his outlook, by far the most locally oriented.
By contrast with the 1994 contest, the 2010 one was a drawn out affair running, effectively, from Labour's general election defeat in early May until the end of September. The longer format marked a return to the original arrangement of the electoral college as it had been operationalised between 1981 and 1988. Arguably there was little by way of detailed policy proposals or political debate. Rather, as the contest progressed much press attention focused on the undeniable human drama that the two frontrunners, David and Ed Miliband, were brothers who while they had been close personally were now on different sides of the party in terms of how they related to the New Labour project. Tempers became frayed over the course of the campaign, particularly in terms of the deteriorating relationship between the Milibands. When the result was declared on 26 September, after three initial rounds of voting in which the other candidates were eliminated, Ed had beaten David by 50.65 to 49.35 per cent. David had won two sections of the electoral college (those of MPs/MEPs and of individual members in CLPs) and had led in the first three rounds. But his lead in the first two sections was dwarfed by Ed Miliband's dominance amongst the party's affiliated trade union members.
Friend and neighbours hypotheses
Within the constraints of the available data, this paper explores three hypotheses derived from the literature on friends-and-neighbours voting patterns. The first refers to local friends -members of the CLP in the candidate's own constituency. Many of these individuals -the average Labour CLP had some 400 members in 1994 and 280 in 2010 -will have known their MP personally, indeed could have been involved in her/his selection as candidate for the seat and have canvassed and campaigned for and with the MP. That personal knowledge and appreciation of the candidate's qualities should mean that many CLP members will support her/his candidacy for party leader, resulting in a stronger performance than average there.
The second hypothesis refers to neighbours, for whom knowledge about the candidate is more likely to be indirect, rather than the direct personal knowledge of local friends. Knowledge and appreciation of a candidate's attributes are likely to spread beyond the home constituency in two ways. The first is through social networks within the party. These are not confined within the territory of a single constituency. Some members in nearby constituencies will have regular -either formal (through supra-constituency party organisations, for example) or informal -contacts with members of the candidate's CLP, through whom they will learn of her/his characteristics and may be canvassed to vote for him/her in the leadership election. These networks will be complemented by other sources of information about the candidate -and for most Labour party members outwith the candidate's home constituency and its immediate neighbours these will be the major sources. The most important, as Bowler et al. (1993) argue, will be the local media. In the UK there are regional TV stations operating within the national networks and a plethora of local radio stations. These, like local and regional newspapers (of which there are several hundred, most with regularly-updated websites as well as -mostly weekly -print editions), invariably cover the territory of more than one Parliamentary constituency and are thus likely to carry items about MPs and their activities into constituencies other than their own, creating publicity that may well stimulate support for them in a leadership contest. Such spreading of electorally-relevant information is likely to have a distancedecay element, so that a leadership candidate's cause is more likely to be advanced in constituencies adjacent to her/his own that in those further afield. That cause may, however, be enhanced if the candidate runs, at least in part, on a localism ticket, presenting her/himself as a local/regional champion. 4 Finally, and this is a mechanism not previously considered in the friends and neighbours literature, there is the influence of political friends. In 1994 and 2010 candidates for the Labour leadership had to be MPs and had to be nominated for the position by at least 12.5 per cent of the party's current MPs (including themselves). Additionally, in those two contests, MPs -along with MEPs -formed one of the three components of the party's electoral college, so the more support that candidates got from their fellow MPs the better their chances of victory. Further, those MPs who support their candidacy are in a position to influence the members of their own CLPs to vote for their favoured candidates, thus enhancing the candidate's cause -especially if those (political friend) MPs are widely distributed across the country and not over-concentrated in the candidate's own region. Although MPs may, to some extent, be influenced in who to support by the views of the own CLP members, most will make their decisions on their evaluation of the candidates' characteristics in terms of experience, leadership potential (not only for the party but also as a potential Prime Minister), general political ideology within the party, and specific policy directions and proposals -as well, in some cases, as personal considerations. 5 Conversations and other contacts within their CLPs could influence which candidate is favoured there, so that CLP members whose MP is going to vote for a named candidate (and most will divulge this to their local party if not more widely through the media and other sources; the list of each candidate's nominators was published at the start of the contest) may give that person more first preference votes than CLP members elsewhere -not least those in constituencies that failed to return a Labour MP at the most recent election and so lack such information and guidance.
It may be that a candidate's political friends -i.e. their supporters among the party's MPs -are also either their neighbours or represent constituencies in the same region, in which case they would simply be agents promoting the local friends component of the model (as well as introducing collinearity to the regression analyses). Inspection of the geography of those political friends shows that this was rarely the case, however. In 1994, none of the MPs who voted for either Beckett or Prescott represented a neighbouring constituency to the candidate's, whereas all six of Blair's neighbours did. In 2010 only one of Abbott's four neighbouring MPs voted for her; one of Balls' four neighbours voted for him; and two of Burnham's five neighbouring MPs were among his supporters; but none of Ed Miliband's four neighbours supported his campaign for the leadership. Only David Miliband -who like Tony Blair represented a north-eastern constituency -won majority support from his neighbours (three of the four MPs).
Turning to the regional dimension, Table 3 shows that in 1994 Prescott was supported by six of the 34 MPs representing constituencies in Yorkshire and the Humber and Beckett by seven of the fourteen East Midlands' MPs, whereas seventeen of the Northeast's twenty-three Labour MPs voted for Blair. In 2010, David Miliband was supported by half of the MPs representing his 'home region' (North-East); both Ed Balls and Ed Miliband were supported by seven of their region's 32 MPs; and just three of London's 36 voted for Diane Abbott. Eleven of Andy Burnham's supporters represented constituencies in the North-West region -but a further 34 there supported one of the other candidates.
In general, therefore, each candidate's political friends were fairly widely distributed across the country -representing both personal alliances and common ground on policy issues. Both David and Ed Miliband got substantial support in Scotland and Wales, for example; Ed Balls performed relatively well among West Midlands' MPs; and John Prescott got almost one-third of his support from Scottish MPs. If these widespread networks of political friends could deliver the votes of their local party members, they could play a significant role in winning support for the candidates' campaigns. According to the hypothesis, therefore, the wider those networks, the better the candidates' performances.
These three hypotheses have been operationalised here by classifying constituencies along a number of dimensions:
• For the local friends hypothesis, we expect each candidate to win more CLP first preference votes in her/his home constituency than on average across all constituencies; • For the neighbours hypothesis, we expect each candidate to perform better than average (a) in the constituencies adjacent to their own, and (b) in the other constituencies within the region where those constituencies are located; 6 and • For the political friends hypothesis, we expect each candidate to win more first preference votes than average in CLPs where the local MP gave them their first preference vote. These are evaluated, first, through an examination of descriptive data showing each candidate's performance in those different groups of constituencies, and then more formally through a regression analysis.
With each of these hypotheses, aggregate data analyses cannot identify whether the specified mechanisms operated in those elections; as with much research at ecological scales, the tests can only establish whether the observed patterns are consistent with the postulated processes. If that is the case, it may nevertheless be that the mechanisms have been mis-specified and that the observed patterns were produced by different processes. Only further research can establish whether that is the case. What we present here is a series of tests of three hypotheses that build on Key's classic work on 'friends and neighbours' voting and its extension by Bowler et al. (1993) by the incorporation of a further mechanism -the influence of 'political friends' (who are neither the candidates' 'local friends' nor, in most cases, their neighbours). A positive outcome will advance and extend the agenda of work in this field.
The pattern of voting
The general pattern of voting at the two contests is shown in Tables 1-2, indicating variations in line with the general expectations. In 1994, Blair averaged a majority of the votes cast across the 633 CL Ps, with Prescott having a clear lead over Beckett in second place; Blair won a majority of the first preference votes in 85 per cent of the CLPs; Prescott won a majority in just two and Beckett in none. All three candidates, according to the standard deviation figures, had a relatively uniform pattern of support across the country. Nevertheless, there were clear exceptions to that, as shown by the voting percentages in their home constituencies: Beckett and Prescott both won more than twice their average level of support there -although Beckett failed to get a majority in her constituency of Derby South (she beat Blair by one percentage point); Blair won 87 per cent support from his CLP's members. The next two rows show that, across all constituencies, each candidate performed better than average in both the neighbouring seats to their own and the remaining constituencies across the wider region in which it is located.
The final block in the table reports the same percentages but only for constituencies that were held by the Labour party and had MPs who participated in the leadership election. None of the neighbouring seats to Beckett's fell in that category (her constituency was an 'isolated Labour island' within Derbyshire at the 1992 election): both Blair and Prescott got c.15 percentage points more support in Labour-held constituencies adjacent to their own; Blair also got substantially more support than his average among CLPs with Labour MPs across the North-East region.
Finally, all three candidates obtained greater support than their average from the CLPs whose Labour MPs gave them their first preference votes -among whom Blair got a clear majority. The percentage points difference for Blair was very small, however, whereas both Beckett and Prescott gained substantially more support from CLP members whose local MPs supported their candidacynearly ten points in Prescott's case.
Turning to the 2010 contest, the overall mean percentages show David Miliband with a clear lead over his brother, and the other three candidates well behind them. The associated standard deviations again suggest relatively uniform patterns of support across the 632 British constituencies, but the other data in Table 2 indicate substantial differences in particular areas -again in line with expectations. Thus, for example, each of the five candidates obtained a very much larger share of the votes cast in their home constituency than the average -more than twice that level in four cases, and eight times as great in Burnham's case. Neither Abbott nor Balls won majority support from their home CLPs, however.
There is a clear gradation in the level of support for each candidate away from the home constituency. Each obtained most support there; a lower level of support -but still above their national average -in neighbouring seats; and a level that was lower again (yet still above their national average) in the wider region: these differences remained when the focus was on Labourheld seats only. (Thus, for example, against a national average support of just 8.8 per cent first preferences, Burnham got 69.1 per cent in his home constituency, 34.3 per cent in the adjacent five seats, and 19.4 per cent across the remaining constituencies in the Northwest region.) In addition, all candidates performed better than average among the CLPs whose MPs voted for them -with Burnham by far the greatest beneficiary of such support. As well as getting larger increases in support in his home constituency, its neighbours and the surrounding region than any of his four opponents, where the local MPs gave him their first preference votes on average he got nearly three times more support from their CLP members than he did across Great Britain as a whole.
Multivariate analysis
The descriptive data in Tables 1-2 show patterns consistent with those hypothesised here: candidates in both of the Labour leadership contests had geographies of support indicative of local friends', neighbours', and political friends' voting. There are, however, potential collinearity problems within the data: of the 23 MPs who gave Burnham their first preference vote, for example, 11 represented seats in the North-West, where his home constituency of Leigh is located, and five of them represented adjacent constituencies to Leigh. To take these confounding issues into account, therefore, multivariate regressions have been undertaken to isolate each factor's independent influence on the candidate's pattern of support.
The dependent variables in these regressions are each candidate's percentage of the first preference votes cast in each CLP. The independent variables are all binary, entered into the regressions as the following dummy variables:
• Home constituency: coded 1 if the candidate represented that constituency, and 0 otherwise; • Neighbouring constituency: coded 1 if the constituency was adjacent to (shared a boundary with) the home constituency, and 0 otherwise; • Region: coded 1 if the constituency was in the same region as the home constituency, and 0 otherwise; 7 and • MP's choice: coded 1 if the local MP gave the candidate her/his first preference vote, and 0 otherwise.
Analysing each candidate's performance separately, using ordinary least squares regression (OLS), was potentially problematic because the sum of the candidates' vote shares cannot be greater than 100 or less than zero but OLS predictions are unbounded. OLS also assumes that a candidate's vote share is independent of the shares of others, but this does not correspond with reality given that if one candidate's vote share is relatively high, then the performance of other candidates must be lower, and vice versa. To avoid that potential problem, particularly with the 1994 contest in which there were only three candidates, we use seemingly unrelated regression (SUR: Cutts and Shryane, 2006; Tomz et al., 2002; Zellner, 1962). 8 In these SUR analyses each candidate's percentage share of the votes cast in each CLP is converted to a ratio with the percentage share obtained by one of the other candidates -chosen as the comparator -using a logistic transformation. For each of the regressions reported here, the comparator or denominator in the vote share ratio is the leading candidate in the CLP contests - Blair in 1994 and David Miliband in 2010. 9 Positive values of the vote share ratio indicate that the candidate performed better than the comparator there; negative values indicate a relatively better performance for Blair in 1994 and David Miliband in 2010 compared to the other candidate. SUR deals with the non-independence of candidate vote shares by stipulating two equations in 1994 and four in 2010 (one each for the dependent variables) to be simultaneously modelled and thereby allowing the residuals to be correlated across equations. The residuals are expected to be positively correlated because in seats where one candidate's vote share is stronger than predicted by the model, then other candidates' performances must be weaker. The SUR analyses were run twice at both leadership contests -once for all constituencies and the other for just those constituencies with a Labour MP. Because the MPs' first preference votes also form a closed number set across the Labour-held seats (i.e. almost all MPs voted for one of the candidates) no dummy variable is included in the regressions for the comparator candidate. In order to check whether the residuals were uncorrelated across equations, we ran a Breusch-Pagan test for each of the four SUR models. The test was highly significant (P<0.0001) in each model, indicating violation of OLS regression assumptions and a clear justification for our decision to use the SUR model. Table 4 reports the SUR results contrasting the patterns of voting for Beckett and Prescott with Blair's: significant coefficients at the 0.05 level or better are shown in bold, and those at the 0.05-0.10 level in italics. Thus, for example, the first two coefficients show that, relative to Blair, Beckett performed badly in Blair's home constituency, but won significantly more support than Blair in her own (significant coefficients of -1.68 and 0.75 respectively). Compared against Blair, Beckett's relative vote share was worse in those constituencies neighbouring Blair's (a marginally significant coefficient of -0.27) but also in that region more generally (coefficient -0.42). However, her relative vote share was significantly, but not very substantially, better in the constituencies in her home region, and she obtained a substantial benefit among those CLPs whose MP gave her their first preferences. This pattern is replicated in the second analysis -of Labour-held seats only -except that there were no neighbouring constituencies to her own to be analysed (all returned an MP from one of the other parties in 1992). Interestingly, Beckett's support from the Lincoln CLP -which she represented in Parliament from 1974-1979 -was only slightly larger than her average of 17 per cent across all constituencies and little over half of her percentage in Derby South. Blair got 63 per cent of the first preference votes in Beaconsfield -where he unsuccessfully fought a 1982 by-electionwhich was some 6 percentage points more than his average across all seats. Beckett's poor performance in Lincoln may reflect a number of factors, most obviously probably a declining impact of 'friends and neighbours' effects over time as individual members of the party leave and are replaced by others as well as her limited tenure in the seat. Lincoln's was, moreover, a divided CLP at the time; it deselected a sitting MP who subsequently won a by-election and the February 1974 general election before being defeated by Beckett in October of that year; the seat was subsequently lost to the Conservatives until 1997. Against Blair in 1994, Beckett did much better in those constituencies where the MP supported her and also in those seats where Prescott gained the local MP's first preference vote; a similar pattern to the latter occurs in the analysis of Prescott's voting pattern.
The pattern of significant coefficients in the analysis of CLP voting for Prescott closely resembles that for Beckett, with one major difference. Beckett picked up little support, relative to Blair, either in neighbouring constituencies to her own or in the wider East Midlands region where her Derby constituency is located. Prescott performed significantly and substantially better than Blair not only in his home constituency of Kingston-upon-Hull East, however, but also in its neighbours and across the Yorkshire and the Humber region more generally.
Turning to the five-member 2010 contest, Table 5 shows a pattern of results again entirely consistent with the hypotheses presented here. (In these analyses, because both Ed Balls and Ed Miliband represented constituencies in the Yorkshire and the Humber region there is a single dummy variable for both -BallsEM region in the table.) Each candidate performed significantly better -relative to David Miliband -in her/his home constituency, and significantly worse in David Miliband's South Shields constituency. When compared against David Miliband, Abbott, Balls and Burnham also performed significantly better in the constituencies adjacent to their own. Ed Miliband's performance was not significantly boosted (relative to his brother's) in the constituencies adjacent to his Doncaster North seat, however. He did get a slight boost across the Yorkshire and the Humber region -but Ed Balls did not.
The analyses confined to Labour-held seats only (the lower block in the table) show that all four candidates performed significantly better than David Miliband in the voting by members of CLPs whose own MPs gave the relevant candidate their first-preference vote. The candidates' MP friends and allies were able to garner extra support for them, with Balls benefiting more than the other three -with the results indicating that Abbott's 'MP friends' were able to deliver less 'extra' support for her than was the case for her opponents, especially Balls and Burnham.
A small number of other significant coefficients highlight patterns additional to those anticipated. Thus, for example, Abbott performed significantly worse, relative to David Miliband, in constituencies adjacent to Burnham's and Ed Miliband's. David Miliband won more support than Balls, Burnham and Ed Miliband in the region containing Diane Abbott's seat -a pattern which almost certainly does not reflect on her strength there but rather the others' collective weakness in London generally. (Burnham, for example, averaged only 5.0 per cent of the CLP first preferences across Labour-held seats in London, compared to 22.4 per cent in the North-West.) And relative to David Miliband, Ed Balls performed significantly better not only among the CLPs for whose MP he was first choice as party leader but also among those who placed Abbott, Burnham or Ed Miliband first: where one of his opponents other than David Miliband was the local MP's choice, Ed Balls performed significantly better than average among the CLP members. This 'anti-David Miliband' position taken by MPs also advantaged some of the other candidates: Diane Abbott won significantly more support relative to David Miliband in CLPs whose MPs supported either Ed Balls or Ed Miliband; Andy Burnham outperformed David Miliband where Ed Miliband was the local MP's choice; and Ed Miliband outperformed his brother where Ed Balls was the local MP's choice. 10
Although the r 2 values in Tables 4 and 5 indicate a reasonable goodness-of-fit for most of the models (high values are relatively rare in analyses where dummy variables predominate) nevertheless there are clearly substantial amounts of unexplained variation. Part of this may be random, but the models may be under-specified, with important variables omitted. It could be, for example, that CLPs vary in their members' predominant opinions (some may be more 'left-wing' than others, for example) and so might be more likely to prefer particular candidates who share those views, but -other than through detailed surveys -it is difficult to establish whether this is the case. 11 It may be that some votes are simply cast on the basis of name recognition, with well-known candidates performing well despite their ideological positions. For example, in 2010 there were elections to the party's National Executive Committee alongside that for the leadership, and in South Shields a well-known left-wing candidate, and former leader of the Greater London Council, Ken Livingstone, got 205 votes in that contest -almost as many (234) as David Miliband (from the Blairite, New Labour wing of the party) got in the leadership election. A further possible source of local influence may be through the trades unions. Many of Britain's unions are affiliated to the Labour party and in the past have sponsored individual MPs, but that practice is now discouraged by the party, which asks for sponsorship to be directed instead to its target seats at each election. Unions and their members might be more active in some areas and constituencies than others, but data on the geography of union density are not available at the scales needed for this study. 12 In both the 1994 and 2010 contests, trade unions played a limited role in the competition for constituency votes, focusing rather on their own section of the electoral college. There were 29 unions involved in the 1994 voting, but by 2010 that had shrunk to 12 (a number of affiliated unions did not take part). In 1994 trade unions were uncertain what impact the new OMOV rules would have and were cautious about their involvement. In 2010, they were more direct in their engagement but such interventions were targeted at their union memberships and not at the CLPs. Different unions might have been more active in some areas and constituencies than others but data are not available to reach definite conclusions. Further extensions to the 'friends and neighbours' model may be able to take these -and other potential influences on the voting patterns -into account.
Conclusions
Friends and neighbours voting patterns are often hidden within a broader picture of support for a candidate and are difficult to discern. As demonstrated in Key's classic study, such localism is much more likely to be not only present but also identifiable at intra-party contests. This argument is sustained by the evidence presented here of analyses of two recent elections to the British Labour party's leadership, a substantial component of which involved the votes being cast and counted by geographical areas -Parliamentary constituencies.
Many of the studies of friends and neighbours patterns are only weakly theorised and offer little more than statistical descriptions of voting geographies that are consistent with the general concept. Because of the nature of the available data, such studies are unlikely to offer other than circumstantial evidence favouring whatever specific hypotheses are being tested, but it is possibleas some authors have shown -to offer and test more precise hypotheses than that candidates will perform better around their home or some other location. 13 This paper has done that, deriving three separate hypotheses -regarding the influence of local friends, neighbours, and political friendsand found each valid, to a greater or lesser extent. Each candidate for the Labour leadership in both 1994 and 2010 won more support (relative to alternative candidates) in their own constituency than elsewhere, thus validating the first hypothesis. Most, too, performed better in neighbouring constituencies and in the wider regions in which they were located (especially if they ran regionallyfocused campaigns, as Andy Burnham did in 2010 14 ), thus validating the second hypothesis. And all got more support from party members in constituencies whose MPs voted for them in their separate component of the party's electoral college, validating the third hypothesis. Friends, neighbours and political friends all delivered votes, producing complex geographies to two intra-party contests and illustrating the general contention put forward here that Key's linking of 'friends and neighbours' voting to localism and support for the 'home-town boy' omits important elements of the geographical contexts within which voters make their decisions.
In the two elections analysed here, all candidates benefited, to a greater or lesser extent, from 'friends and neighbours' effects -even those with no roots in the area that they represent. In these cases, at least, the effects result more from the distribution of information -not only in and around the candidates' home constituencies but also in those constituencies elsewhere whose elected MPs support them -than from the 'hometown boy' influence Key proposed, even though some candidates might promote themselves as such. Their profiles are, it seems, enhanced by both formal and informal flows of information, whose nature calls for further research to uncover the main processes underpinning the patterns observed here -and which has very largely been absent from studies of 'friends and neighbours' voting.
Endnotes 1 Nominations and votes by MEPS (Members of the European Parliament) are not considered here: they are elected by region from closed party lists and have no local constituency links. 2 There was no geographical breakdown of voting in that contest (or the concurrent one for the deputy leadership), which used AV in a single constituency -although the votes by party members, associates and supporters were separately reported. 3 Beckett clearly did better than Prescott among the party's 62 MEPs, since she had slightly more votes than him from the MPs and MEPs combined. 4 An experimental study (Campbell and Cowley, 2014 ; see also Campbell and Lovenduski, 2015) has shown that British voters prefer MPs who are local to their constituency; whether this extends to party leaders is unknown. 5 Yvette Cooper, wife of one of the candidates in the 2010 contest, Ed Balls, was Labour MP for a West Yorkshire constituency adjacent to his. She was one of the MPs who nominated him and she gave him her first preference vote; her CLP also nominated him. 6 It could be argued that CLP members who vote for a candidate in line with one of these first two hypotheses may be potentially harming the electoral chances of the candidate they consider best fitted to be leader. However, because the AV system of preferential voting was deployed, if a 'friends and neighbours' vote was given for a candidate with little chance of overall success, then her/his second preferences would be reallocated if, as would be likely, no candidate got an overall majority on the first preferences. 7 Great Britain's eleven standard regions were deployed: North-East; North-West; Yorkshire and the Humber; West Midlands; East Midlands; East of England; Greater London; South-East; South-West; Wales; Scotland. 8 Few analyses of ratio data (including closed number sets involving percentages) deploy this procedure which tackles the problem of correlated residuals that are quite normal in such analyses. 9 The log candidate vote shares are defined as (using 1994 election as an example): Beckett-Blair = ln (Beckett_VS/Blair_VS); Prescott-Blair = ln(Prescott_VS/Blair_VS). This transformation maps the bounded candidate vote shares on to an unbounded (-to +) vote share ratio measure. 10 Before they became MPs Ed Balls and Ed Miliband worked together in the Treasury for Gordon Brown, who they were seeking to succeed as party leader. 11 A major survey of Labour members was undertaken in the 1980s, but the constituencies have been changed twice since then and only a sample were surveyed (Seyd and Whiteley, 1992) . The original data from the survey covered 487 of the constituencies used in the 1994 Labour leadership election, of which 202 were Labour-held seats then (but excluded both Derby South and Hull East). With those data we characterised each respondent (i.e. Labour member) on a left-right attitudinal index: as we knew which Constituency Labour Party each member was from, we were then able to calculate average left-righ scores for each CLP in the survey. This allows an estimate of whether more left-wing CLPs supported more left-wing leadership candidates . To do this, we re-ran the regressions in Table 4 , adding the CLP left-right scores and found that, with all other variables held constant and remaining statistically significant, left-leaning CLPs were more likely to vote for Beckett than for Blair, but not also more likely to vote for Prescott rather than for Blair. 12 The data from the 2015 British Election Study surveys show that around 17 per cent of the adult population in each region are members of a trade union: under 60 per cent of all union members were also members of the Labour party. 13 Home location has not been included in the analyses here. Virtually all UK MPs have two homes -one in their constituency and one in London. For most the London home is a pied à terre, used when the MP is working at Parliament. Of the three candidates in 1994, only Blair had his main home in London, but he did not obtain substantial support in either Islington North or Islington South constituency: his family home was in Islington at the time. 14 After running on a strong localism agenda in 2010, Burnham again contested the leadership in 2015 following Ed Miliband's post-election defeat resignation -this time as one of the favoured candidates and thus needing support nationally. Nevertheless, of the 68 Labour MPs who nominated him then, 25 were from his home region of the North-West and another 32 from the other two northern regions (North-East and Yorkshire and the Humber) plus Wales. He obtained nominations from only 4 of London's 45 Labour MPs then, and 7 from the 52 other Labour MPs representing regions in the English Midlands, South-East, South-West and Eastern regions, plus Scotland. As a candidate with strong local roots -unlike many UK MPs -Burnham clearly decided to capitalise on them, but they were insufficient to deliver victory. 
